Is the Burger Court Really Like the Warren Court? by Bender, Paul
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 82 Issue 4 
1984 
Is the Burger Court Really Like the Warren Court? 
Paul Bender 
University of Pennsylvania 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Judges Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United 
States Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Paul Bender, Is the Burger Court Really Like the Warren Court?, 82 MICH. L. REV. 635 (1984). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol82/iss4/2 
 
This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
IS THE BURGER COURT REALLY LIKE THE 
WARREN COURT? 
Paul Bender* 
THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T. 
Edited by Vincent Blasi. New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press. 1983. Pp. xiv, 326. $25. 
The Burger Court: The Counter-Revolution That Wasn't (a book 
sponsored by the Society of American Law Teachers) is a collection 
of eleven essays about the Supreme Court written by prominent aca-
demic commentators. Ten of the contributions are from law teach-
ers; one is by a political scientist. The first nine essays deal with 
separate substantive aspects of Supreme Court jurisprudence; most 
of these focus to a large extent on how Burger Court decisions in 
particular subject-matter areas compare with doctrines and decisions 
of the Warren Court on the same topics. Thus, Thomas Emerson ( of 
Yale) writes about the Burger Court and freedom of the press; Nor-
man Dorsen (NYU) and Joel Gora (Brooklyn) about free speech 
and the Burger Court; Robert W. Bennett (Northwestern) about the 
Burger Court and poverty law; Yale Kamisar (Michigan) about Bur-
ger Court decisions relating to police practices; Robert A. Burt 
(Yale) about family law and children's rights; Paul Brest (Stanford) 
about racial discrimination; Ruth Bader Ginsburg ( of Columbia, but 
since appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit) about sex discrimination; Theodore J. St. 
Antoine (Michigan) about labor law; and R.S. Markovits (Texas) 
about the Burger Court and antitrust law. 
The final two essays deal with topics of a more general nature. 
The book's editor, Vincent Blasi (Columbia), compares the degrees 
of "activism" of the Burger and Warren Courts. And the sole non-
lawyer in the group, Martin Shapiro (a professor of jurisprudence 
and social policy at Berkeley), considers changes in the character of 
scholarly commentary about the Court - specifically, how the cur-
rent generation of academic critics now focuses its attention, not on 
the Court's apparent lack of self-restraint (as commentators did dur-
ing the Warren Court years), but on the Court's value choices, taking 
a high level of judicial "activism" for granted. Professor Blasi pro-
vides a brief Preface; an equally brief Foreword is contributed by 
• Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. A.B. 1954; LL.B. 1957, Harvard Univer-
sity. -Ed. 
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New York Times columnist Anthony Lewis, who was once that pa-
per's distinguished Supreme Court correspondent. There are, in ad-
dition, short profiles of the Justices who have sat on the Court during 
the Burger years, a brief chronology of important Burger Court ap-
pointments and decisions, and a Burger Court bibliography. 
The subtitle of this book is, as I have already noted, "The 
Counter-Revolution That Wasn't." This theme - that despite 
widely prevalent fears (or hopes, depending upon one's point of 
view) that the Burger Court would undo much of the "revolution-
ary" work of the Warren Court in individual rights and related 
areas, those changes have not, in fact, occurred - is repeated in both 
the Foreword and the Preface. Thus, Mr. Lewis asserts that, al-
though six members of the Warren Court have so far been replaced 
by nominees of Republican presidents, "there has been nothing like 
a counter- revolution" (p. vii). In Professor Blasi's similar view, 
"[t]he story of the Burger Court to date, whatever else it may be, is 
not a tale of a conservative counter-revolution, at least not one of 
epic proportions or obvious import" (p. xii). 
I would like very much to believe that there hasn't been "any-
thing like" a conservative counter-revolution in the Supreme Court 
in the past dozen or so years. As one who generally agreed with the 
energy and direction of the Warren Court's individual rights deci-
sions - and with the way those decisions appeared to increase the 
receptivity of lower courts (especially lower federal courts) to indi-
vidual rights claims - it would be good to know that, despite large 
changes in the Court's membership since 1968 through appointments 
by presidents ideologically opposed to many Warren Court develop-
ments, the level ofrecognition and protection of rights has not signif-
icantly decreased. And it would be even more comforting to know 
that the counter-revolution truly "wasn't" -that, insofar as "contro-
versial Warren Court doctrines" have survived so far, they have be-
come so "securely rooted"1 that the time of danger is past. 
It is my sad duty to report, however, that the substantive essays 
that constitute the main contents of this book simply do not support 
this optimistic theme. And I am even sorrier to report that, given the 
lack of specific and separate attention in the book to some important 
subjects - such as diminished access to federal courts, the revived 
"state action" doctrine, the use of the death penalty, and the impact 
of Supreme Court trends and certiorari policy on lower court atti-
tudes and decisions - the reality of just how much erosion has taken 
place is perhaps not even fully reflected in those contents. For, 
whether or not one characterizes them as "epic" or "obvious," there 
have surely been very substantial changes in the Supreme Court over 
the last fifteen years. That is true, I think, if one merely considers 
I. The observation is Mr. Lewis's. P. vii. 
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the chances of winning most civil liberties, civil rights, welfare rights, 
prisoners' rights, police practices or similar cases now, as compared 
with the chances of winning such cases in 1969. It is even more 
clearly true, I think, if one compares the current situation with 
where things probably would have been today had Warren Court de-
velopments continued in the direction in which they seemed to be 
headed when Richard Nixon became President in 1969. 
Consider, for example, that Justice Brennan, as editor Blasi cor-
rectly recognizes, operated "at the center of the Court's divisions 
... during the heyday of the Warren Court." Justi<~e Brennan, 
however, is clearly (again in Blasi's words) a "dissenter on the left" 
today (p. 211). The reason for this shift, I think all would agree, is 
the Court's substantial movement to the "right" rather than any no-
ticeable shift by Justice Brennan in the other direction. And as for 
the use of the past tense in the book's subtitle, any sense ofreliefthat 
the reader might momentarily experience in this regard will quickly 
disappear, I venture, when one later comes upon Professor Blasi's 
depressing speculation that Justice Rehnquist may, in time, have the 
chance to serve as a "coalition builder'' "operating at the center of 
the Court's divisions" (p. 211, emphasis added). If there has not yet 
been a "counter-revolution" on a Court where Brennan has moved 
from center to extreme left, it will be difficult (to say the least) to 
avoid the use of that or a similar term to describe changes through 
which Justice Rehnquist (who even now remains on the extreme 
right) comes to be a Court "moderate." 
Whether there has been a Burger Court "counter-revolution" 
turns, of c9urse, upon just what one means by that term in the con-
text of changing trends in Supreme Court decisionmaking. In the 
area of politics and government generally, "counter-revolution" sug-
gests a sudden, indeed cataclysmic, change of major proportions -
new and dramatically different personnel quickly accomplishing 
comprehensive and fundamental reversals of basic principles and 
objectives. There has not, of course, been a Burger Court counter-
revolution in that sense. But, absent mass murder, war, epidemic or 
natural disaster, the whole membership of the Supreme Court sim-
ply does not change in a week or two, in a year or two, or even in a 
decade. Supreme Court Justices do after all, unlike politicians, hold 
office during good behavior. 
President Nixon, the initiator of the Burger Court, thus inherited 
a Court with few (if any) members whom Nixon himself would have 
appointed. Nixon, it is true, had a relatively large number of vacan-
cies to fill within a short time after assuming the presidency in 1969. 
By 1972 he was able to appoint four Justices (Burger, Blackmun, 
Powell and Rehnquist, replacing, respectively, Warren, Fortas, 
Black and Harlan). All of these appointments appeared at the time 
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to be strongly influenced by ideological considerations. But, even so, 
Warren Court holdovers (Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White 
and Marshall) still comprised the majority of the Court after the four 
'Nixon appointments. President Nixon had no additional opportuni-
ties to make Court appointments before resigning in 1974. The next 
appointment to the Court (Justice Stevens, appointed by President 
Ford to replace Justice Douglas) was not strongly ideological in na-
ture. Thus, it was not until President Reagan's 1981 appointment of 
Justice O'Connor (to replace Justice Stewart) - an appointment 
made after most parts of the present book were written - that a 
majority of the Court could be expected to harbor serious counter-
revolutionary tendencies. And by that time at least one of the Nixon 
appointees (Justice Blackmun) had lost some of the counter-revolu-
tionary fervor he may once have possessed.2 It should come as no 
surprise, therefore, that the 1970's - and even the early 1980's -
saw no Supreme Court "counter-revolution" worthy of the name in 
the ordinary political sense. 
Two additional factors must be considered when judging the 
scope of a judicial counter-revolution (as compared with an ordinary 
political coup). One is the doctrine of stare decisis, which political 
revolutionaries seldom take seriously. Even the most radical (in 
either direction) new Justice will ordinarily be very reluctant to de-
part from established precedent in a sudden and wholesale manner. 
This respect for the past, moreover, is perhaps most apt to be found 
in judges, like those appointed by Nixon and Reagan, who have 
been selected in large part for their supposed inclinations toward 
"self-restraint" or "nonactivism." Thus, the Warren Court "revolu-
tion" (being a movement generally oriented toward increased judi-
cial activism) could have been expected to be even more 
revolutionary in nature than its Burger Court counterpart. 
The Warren Court certainly appeared to start with a bang when 
Brown v. Board of Education3 overruled the separate-but-equal doc-
trine of P/essy v. Ferguso~ within a year of Chief Justice Warren's 
appointment. This, however, was not a sudden "revolutionary" de-
velopment by any means. P/essy, itself more than fifty years old, had 
been steadily eroded by the Court over a substantial period of time;5 
the question in 1954 was no longer over the fact, but rather over the 
timing, the explicitness, the breadth, and the forum (Congress or the 
courts) of its ultimate demise. And, as is well known, while Brown 
2. Life tenure judicial appointees are not always known quantities. On the Warren Court, 
for example, it is likely that Justices Warren and Brennan, and in some respects perhaps Jus-
tice Harlan, turned out differently from what President Eisenhower and his advisors had 
expected. 
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
4. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
5. E.g., Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938). 
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eliminated separate-but-equal schools in principle, meaningful War-
ren Court enforcement (and hence, much meaningful lower court 
enforcement) was long delayed.6 Subsequent prominent Warren 
Court doctrinal developments were not nearly so quick in coming, 
nor, outside the area of criminal procedure, were overruling deci-
sions terribly numerous. For example, it was not until 1961 that 
Mapp v. Ohio7 overruled Wo!f v. ColoradOS (thus imposing the ex-
clusionary rule upon the states as a constitutional requirement), al-
though the opportunity to do so must have been present at every 
Term of Court after Justices Warren and Brennan joined the Court. 
The small torrent of other overruling or ground-breaking criminal 
procedure decisions9 arrived only ten years after Chief Justice War-
ren was appointed and, indeed, only after Justice Goldberg had re-
placed Justice Frankfurter (who took a very different view on such 
issues) in 1962. Moreover, most of these criminal procedure cases 
were manifestations of the Court's ultimate adoption of the doctrine 
of selective "incorporation" of Bill of Rights guarantees into the 
fourteenth amendment, a slowly developing approach that Justice 
Frankfurter had staunchly opposed, with decreasing success, 
throughout his career on the bench, but that had been consistently 
urged in dissent for many years by Justices Black and Douglas.10 
The Goldberg appointment tipped the balance here, and once 
tipped, a solid "incorporationist" majority emerged.11 
My point is that just as the Warren Court did not make "epic" 
changes overnight, it would have been completely unrealistic to have 
anticipated any dramatic counter-revolutionary rightist coup on the 
Supreme Court immediately upon the appointment of Justices Bur-
ger and Blackmun in 1969 and 1970, or even upon the appointment 
of Justices Powell and Rehnquist in 1972. Such changes became 
plausible only with the appointment of Justice O'Connor in 1981, at 
the very end of the period covered by this book. Even then, such 
changes could generally be expected (given ordinary attitudes about 
stare decisis) only where some groundwork had been laid either in a 
pattern of dissents of increasing strength, through majority decisions 
6. The delay was attributable to some extent to the "all deliberate speed" (rather than 
immediate desegregation) approach taken in the Brown implementation decision. Brown v. 
Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
7. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
8. 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
9. E.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. l (1964). 
IO. E.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947). 
11. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). Only Justices Harlan and Stewart 
dissented in JJuncan. Justices Black and Douglas had argued for total incorporation rather 
than the much more limited approach of Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) and 
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947). The Warren Court ultimately adopted a compro-
mise - selective incorporation -that has, in practice, been quite close to the Black-Douglas 
view. 
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that consistently eroded the substance of existing doctrines while (for 
the time at least) preserving their form, or both. And, indeed, we 
now find the Court, after Justice O'Connor's appointment, explicitly 
turning its attention, for example, to the broad modification of the 
Mapp exclusionary rule, 12 a Warren Court doctrine that has been 
steadily eroded during the Burger Court years and has been the tar-
get of consistent criticism in dissent by some of the Burger Court 
Justices. 13 
A second factor that should be borne in mind in appraising the 
"counter-revolutionary" nature of the Burger Court changes is the 
nature of the Warren Court "revolution" that is under attack. The 
Warren Court, it should be remembered, did not invent the princi-
ples embodied in the first, fourth, fifth or sixth amendments, or even 
the theoretical applicability to the States of at least the "core" of 
their provisions.14 The Warren Court did not invent the right to 
travel, 15 the constitutional prohibition against racism, 16 or even the 
potential use of the equal protection clause to nonracial forms of 
fundamentally unfair discrimination.17 Warren Court changes in 
substantive constitutional doctrine were, more often than not, incre-
mental in nature. More importantly, many of that Court's most im-
portant developments had to do with making rights that had 
previously been recognized in theory actually enforceable and mean-
ingful, especially for the disadvantaged. Perhaps the most significant 
single Warren Court accomplishment was the enormous expansion 
of the justiciability of, and availability of remedies for, individual 
rights claims, particularly in the lower federal courts.18 A spirit of 
reform in this regard was set loose in the lower courts and in the 
country as a whole. 
An effective revisionist movement negating this spirit and these 
12. See Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983). After first hearing argument on probable 
cause issues, the Court then set the case for reargument regarding "[w]hether the rule requiring 
the exclusion at a criminal trial of evidence offered in violation of the Fourth Amendment, 
• . • should to any extent be modified, so as, for example, not to require the exclusion of 
evidence obtained in the reasonable belief that the search and seizure at issue was consistent 
with the Fourth Amendment." 103 S. Ct. at 2321. After reargument the Court declined to 
reach the question of modifying the exclusionary rule, on the ground that the issue had not 
been raised in the state courts below. The Court thereafter granted certiorari in three cases in 
which the issue of a good faith exception had been considered (and rejected) below. Massa-
chusetts v. Sheppard, 103 S. Ct. 3534 (1983); Colorado v. Quintero, 103 S. Ct. 3535, dismissed 
as moot, 52 U.S.L.W. 3460 (U.S. Dec. 13, 1983); United States v. Leon, 103 S. Ct. 3535 (1983). 
13. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting). 
14. See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
IS. See, e.g., Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941). 
16. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
17. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
18. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); 
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
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developments need not have the "obvious" or "epic" quality found 
lacking by Professor Blasi and Mr. Lewis. That negation can be ac-
complished to quite a significant extent by an explicit halt to further 
development, by the subtle (and often not so subtle) erosion of ex-
isting doctrines (even though few are overruled outright), by indica-
tions in Supreme Court opinions of new and different directions and 
priorities, by the selective use of the Court's discretionary jurisdic-
tion to review lower court decisions that continue in the old spirit 
(while leaving undisturbed those that respond to the new signals), 
and, most of all, by closing down access to federal courts and to pro-
phylactic remedies needed to make many rights meaningful. When 
we look at the substantive chapters of the present book with these 
realistic counter-revolutionary possibilities in mind (and when we 
contemplate what lies ahead in light of the changes in Court mem-
bership that must, inevitably, take place in the not too distant future, 
given the fact that five of the current Justices are seventy-five or 
older), we find a panorama substantially less in keeping with the 
maintenance of Warren Court values than "the counter-revolution 
that wasn't" theme suggest~. 
In examining the Burger Court decisions on the freedom of the 
press, for example, Professor Emerson concludes that, while it is an 
overstatement to say (as some in the press have) that the Burger 
Court has created an "atmosphere of intimidation," there is never-
theless "cause for serious concern. The press no longer receives the 
vigorous support given it by the Warren Court. . . . [T]he Burger 
Court has taken a 'crabbed view' of the First Amendment and has 
exhibited a 'disturbing insensitivity' to the role of the press. In doing 
so it has significantly reduced the protections afforded the press by 
the First Amendment. And its methods of dealing with First 
Amendment problems bode ill for the future" (p. 25). The Burger 
Court "has either forgotten or ignored the most fundamental tenet of 
First Amendment theory, namely, that freedom of expression occu-
pies a special status in our constitutional structure" (p. 26). There 
has been "a consistent deterioration of First Amendment doctrine," 
a "lack of realism" that will foster an increasing gap "between the 
rights of the press as laid down in the marble halls of the Supreme 
Court and its rights under workaday conditions" (p. 26). Emerson's 
conclusions are based on (among other things) the Court's narrowing 
of the protection afforded by the Warren Court against libel actions 
in public interest and public figure cases;19 the Burger Court's "un-
. sympathetic and largely negative" (p. 25) attitude toward the right to 
gather news;20 and the Court's refusal even to "acknowledge that 
19. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 
418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
20. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
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any substantial First Amendment issue was at stake" (p. 14) in the 
CIA's successful attempts at prior censorship of its former employ-
ees' publications. 21 
Writing on the Burger Court and freedom of speech, Professors 
Dorsen and Gora reach a similarly bleak conclusion: 
A major theme emerging from a decade of Burger Court jurisprudence 
is a reemergence of an older concept that the primary office of civil 
liberties is to safeguard property and contract . . . . 
. . . [T]he Court has been suspicious of free speech when it has 
appeared to conflict with traditional proprietary rights . . . . [F]ree 
speech has been treated as simply one factor to be weighed in the bal-
ance, with no recognition that speech should be first among equals in 
the pantheon of liberty. [P. 44]. 
The Burger Court thus has a vision of society as "orderly, stable and 
rational" - a vision leading to lessened protection of "risky" speech 
(p. 45). For examples of those developments, Dorsen and Gora 
point to Burger Court decisions expanding the speech rights of cor-
porations, 22 commercial advertisers,23 and the rich,24 while con-
tracting the public forum in which speech may take place ( especially 
with regard to "private" property such as large suburban shopping 
centers),25 and broadening the permissible scope of obscenity and 
related laws.26 They might also have noted the Burger Court's sub-
stantial contraction of the doctrines of unconstitutional vagueness 
and overbreadth,27 leaving citizens who wish to engage in public 
speech much more at the mercy of police and other official discretion 
than was true in the latter Warren Court days. 
The area of free expression ( despite the foregoing) is one in 
which most civil libertarians tend to think that the Burger Court has 
done relatively well. What of other areas - poverty law, police 
practices, and equal protection, for example - where the Burger 
Court generally gets lower marks from those who remember the 
Warren Court with affection? In this connection Professor Bennett 
notes, among other things, the enormous change of Supreme Court 
attitude in the area of poverty law indicated by comparing Shapiro v. 
Thompson,28 one of the last important decisions in which Chief Jus-
21. The case referred to is Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980), 
22. E.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). 
23. E.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Commn., 447 U.S. 557 (1980), 
24. E.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I (1976). 
25. E.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976). 
26. E.g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Young v. American Mini Thea-
tres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
27. E.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973). 
28. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
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tice Warren participated, with .Dandridge v. Wil!iamfl-9 one of the 
earliest welfare law decisions after Burger replaced Warren. Bennett 
describes how Shapiro had raised hopes among welfare rights advo-
cates that the Court was beginning to engage in strict scrutiny of 
welfare classifications whenever " 'the very means to subsist - food, 
shelter and other necessities of life' "30 were at stake. .Dandridge 
quickly dashed those hopes. The Court there "returned to an ex-
treme form of pre-Shapiro judicial deference to government deci-
sions" in welfare cases even while acknowledging "that welfare 
'involved the most basic economic needs of impoverished human be-
ings' " (p. 48). Thus, .Dandridge - quite unlike Shapiro - likened 
equal protection claims in welfare cases to similar claims in "busi-
ness regulation cases" (p. 48), where the Court had long since aban-
doned meaningful review. Although Bennett does not directly 
examine the repercussive effects of this attitudinal change within the 
lower federal courts, those courts (and welfare rights lawyers) have 
certainly received the message; there is no question that some cases 
that would have been won had the spirit of Shapiro persisted are 
often not even litigated today. Bennett also expresses concern about 
the Burger Court's limitations on the poor's access to the courts to 
assert rights that, in form at least, they still retain. Citing examples 
that he variously describes as "mischievous," "strained," and of 
"Catch-22" quality, he notes (in what may strike the reader as some-
what generous understatement) that the Court "has been rather in-
sensitive to the importance of litigation as a vehicle by which the 
rule oflaw is made available to the poor population" (pp. 58-60). As 
he properly observes, even constitutional law "that explicitly and 
sympathetically incorporates problems of poverty" is "useless to the 
poor if they do not have the ability to invoke it" (p. 60). 
In writing about police practices, Professor Kamisar appears to 
try more valiantly than most of the other Burger Court authors to 
give support to the counter-revolution-that-wasn't theme. He ven-
tures that, while "[o]f course, Warren Court developments in the po-
lice practices area have by no means escaped unscathed," 
nevertheless "the fears that the Burger Court would dismantle the 
work of the Warren Court ( or the Bill of Rights itself), and the re-
ports that such dismantling was well underway, seem to have been 
considerably exaggerated" (p. 68). But consider the following evi-
dence, also from Professor Kamisar's essay, that might suggest a 
somewhat different conclusion. In 1972, says Kamisar, the Burger 
Court, in Kirby v. I/linois,31 "gutted the Warren Court's 'line-up de-
29. 397 U.S. 471 (1970). 
30. P. 48. The quotation is from the Shapiro opinion, 394 U.S. at 627. 
31. 406 U.S. 682 (1972). 
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cisions' " (p. 68). 32 Kirby and its progeny may well be "the saddest 
chapter in modem American criminal procedure" (p. 72). These de-
cisions were "not in keeping with a judicial system bent on dealing 
with the realities of the criminal process rather than its labels" (pp. 
69-70). Moreover, lower courts were undoubtedly "watching for sig-
nals from the 'new Court' "; these Burger Court rulings "could only 
encourage them to commence, or to intensify, efforts to 'contain' (or 
worse) the [Warren Court line-up decisions] in other respects, or for 
that matter to give other landmark Warren Court decisions similar 
treatment. The new Court had showed them how" (p. 70). A Court 
determined to effectuate rights, Kamisar notes, must be, "as the 
Warren Court often was, strong on follow-through, on closing loop-
holes and blocking police-prosecution end-runs. . . . [A] Supreme 
Court may do considerable damage simply by doing nothing." In 
the pretrial identification area "the Burger Court did more damage 
than that" (pp. 71-72). 
Consider as well Kamisar's appraisal of Stone v. Powe/1,33 in 
which the Burger Court held that fourth amendment exclusionary 
rule claims are not ordinarily available to defendants bringing fed-
eral habeas corpus proceedings. Stone, says Kamisar, illustrates "the 
tendency of the Burger Court to 'narrow the thrust' of the exclusion-
ary rule," while preserving the rule in principle (p. 73). Thus, exclu-
sionary rule standing requirements have been stiffened,34 the fruit-
of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine restricted,35 the exclusionary rule held 
inapplicable outside the criminal trial itself,36 and so on. And 
"[e]ven more disquieting" is the way in which the Court has "nar-
rowed the substantive protection provided by the Fourth Amend-
ment" "[b ]y taking a crabbed view of what constitutes a 'search' or 
'seizure,' " by "stretching the concept of 'consent,' " and by ex-
panding exceptions to the warrant requirement: "That the Burger 
Court delivered some heavy blows to the Fourth Amendment, there 
can be no denying" (pp. 74-78).37 The blows have continued since 
Kamisar's chapter was written; witness, for example, the recent over-
ruling of two Warren Court decisions closely restricting the use of 
32. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
33. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 
34. E.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). 
35. E.g., United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978). 
36. E.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). 
37. Kamisar does make the point that there has not been retreat "on all search and seizure 
fronts." P. 78. Ominously, one of the main indications of this for Kamisar is the fact that "the 
Burger Court has not abolished [or interposed a "good faith" exception to] the exclusionary 
rule" itself. P. 81. Why "ominously''? Because, after Kamisar wrote his chapter, and after 
Justice O'Connor's appointment, the Court expressly proposed - and is presently considering 
- just such a modification. See note 12 supra. 
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informant evidence as the basis for probable cause. 38 Kamisar tells 
much the same story about Burger Court decisions regarding police 
interrogation and confessions: For a decade the Court treated Mi-
randa "unkindly" in a number of cases; perhaps even more signifi-
cantly, "its general hostility toward Miranda thundered louder than 
its specific holdings"39 - a thunder, one might suppose, not likely to 
be lost on state and lower federal courts. 
The remaining substantive chapters provide similar evidence of 
enormously significant changes in doctrine, in remedies, in access 
and in overall direction and atmosphere. With regard to the Burger 
Court and labor law, for example, Professor St. Antoine sees as a 
"bombshell" the Court's 1977 ruling4° - contrary to uniform lower 
court precedents and clear legislative understandings - that Title 
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act does not invalidate "bona fide" em-
ployment seniority systems that perpetuate the effects of prior racial 
and gender discrimination (p. 159). The Court thus "set the clock 
back to 1964" (p. 160); it favored "the long-term, organized, 
predominantly white worker'' over "the black newcomer to the 
workplace" (p. 161). In union-management relations cases gener-
ally, the Burger Court "expressly overruled two of the Warren 
Court's major prounion decisions and significantly cut back or ·un-
dermined three others," thus demonstrating "greater solicitude . . . 
for conservative values, such as an employer's property rights and 
managerial prerogatives" (p. 166). And in the antitrust field, Profes-
sor Markovits, while believing that the Burger Court has, by and 
large, adopted the correct approach to the antitrust laws - an ap-
proach under which those laws "should be interpreted to contain a 
purely economic test oflegality" (p. 181) - nevertheless recognizes 
that large changes have, indeed, occurred. He notes a change in phi-
losophy (not unrelated, I suspect, to Burger Court attitudes about 
individual rights issues) in which "[n]oneconomic values" have been 
replaced with "an antitrust brew with an exclusively economic 
flavor" (p. 183). 
In writing about family law, Professor Burt does not focus specif-
ically on the differences between Warren and Burger Court decisions 
(probably because there were, in fact, relatively few Warren Court 
precedents to compare). He does, however, detect a clear difference 
on the present court between "liberal" and "conservative" blocs:· 
"While the conservatives assess the legitimacy of :earticular [parental 
38. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983), overruling Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 
(1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). 
39. P. 85. Although Kamisar also notes that the Burger Court's hostility to Warren Court 
doctrine in this area seemed "to have subsided" in the late 1970's, p. 91, one wonders, in view 
of the current explicit attack on the exclusionary rule,see note 12supra, about the permanence 
of this truce as well. 
40. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). 
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or societal] claims to authority [over family matters] by reference to 
traditional conceptions of social order, the liberals see legitimacy 
only for authority that can justify itself by giving reasons, prodded 
by adversarial questioning" (p. 105). The views of Burt's current 
"liberal" bloc, I would think, bear a close resemblance to those that 
would have been held by the Warren Court, were it still sitting; his 
"conservatives" likely represent the Burger Court's emerging ap-
proach. If so, we are likely to see (and are in fact seeing) fewer deci-
sions like those Warren Court rulings that held that school 
authorities had acted unconstitutionally in prohibiting students from 
wearing black armbands in class in protest against the Vietnam 
War,41 and that gave children relatively strong procedural due pro-
cess rights in juvenile delinquency proceedings;42 and more decisions 
like those of the new Burger Court rejecting constitutional objections 
to the summary administration of corporal punishment in public 
schools,43 and holding that parents and judges together may, by 
withholding consent, prevent children from obtaining legal 
abortions.44 
The chapters on gender and race discrimination also concentrate 
less than do most others on differences between Warren and Burger 
Court attitudes. This is understandable where gender is concerned 
for, as Judge Ginsburg observes, sex discrimination was "not on the 
agenda of the Warren Court" or, indeed, of any prior Court (p. 132). 
Burger Court gender discrimination doctrine thus had only one 
available direction in which to proceed. And, in fact, this is one of 
the two major areas - aspects of the right of privacy being the other 
- where the Burger Court clearly seems to have enlarged the scope 
of individual rights principles. It seems fair to assume, however, 
that, had the Warren Court continued into the 1970's, its agenda 
would also have come to include gender questions. If so, those issues 
might have been addressed with considerably more vigor and e.ff ec-
tiveness than we see today. The Burger Court, for example, has re-
jected full "strict" scrutiny for gender classifications, opting instead 
for a more flexible "intermediate" approach.45 In 1973, however, a 
plurality of four members of the Court, all holdovers from the War-
ren era, urged just such strict scrutiny in gender cases.46 The chances 
are great, it seems to me, that, from among Justices Warren, Fortas, 
Black and Harlan (all of whom had by then left the Court), at least 
41. Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
42. In re Gault, 387 U.S. l (1967). 
43. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977). 
44. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). 
45. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
46. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (opinion of Brennan, Douglas, 
White and Marshall, JJ.). 
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one vote would have been forthcoming so as to turn this plurality 
into a majority. What Judge Ginsburg thus describes as "a near 
great leap forward" (p. 135) would actually have come to pass. 
To take some other Burger Court developments that Judge Gins-
burg deplores (albeit with characteristic mildness of tone), the War-
ren Court might also have decided to treat pregnancy classifications 
as gender-related. The Burger Court did not see the connection, 
over the dissents of three Warren Court holdovers.47 It might have 
held that de jure gender segregation in public education, like de jure 
race segregation, violated equal protection. An equally divided Bur-
ger Court affirmed the contrary result in 1977.48 It might have struck 
down Congress' for-males-only draft registration (upheld by the 
Burger Court. in 1981).49 It might even have detected gender dis-
crimination problems in Massachusetts's veterans preference scheme 
for state civil service employment - a system that had the effect, 
given the tiny percentage of female veterans (a percentage itself re-
sulting, in part, from deliberate discrimination), of almost com-
pletely excluding qualified women from many upper-level positions. 
The Burger Court found the system - despite its undeniable dis-
criminatory effect - to be gender "neutral."50 And the Warren 
Court might possibly have found a way to hold that governmental 
funding of childbirth, but not abortion, for the indigent violated the 
essential principle of the 1973 abortion decisions. The Burger Court, 
as we know, has held that funding discriminations do not affect free-
dom of choice in the constitutional sense.51 
The opening theme of Professor Brest's essay on race discrimina-
tion is that "[t]he Warren Court really had it pretty easy" (p. 113). 
Race discrimination cases of the 1950's and 1960's, he observes, in-
volved discrimination of an "egregious nature"; discrimination 
against blacks "for no other reason than that they were black"; dis-
crimination that was ''widely perceived as a national moral disaster'' 
(p. 113). The Burger Court, however, has had to deal with more 
difficult questions: the desegregation of schools in the North as well 
as in the South (including attempts to desegregate across city-subur-
ban boundaries); the constitutionality of racially discriminatory ef-
fects (rather than consciously discriminatory purposes); and the 
constitutionality of race-conscious affirmative action. 
47. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (the dissenters were Brennan, Douglas and 
Marshall, JJ.). 
48. Vorchheimer v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 430 U.S. 703 (1977). 
49. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981). Justices Brennan, White and Marshall, all 
Warren Court holdovers, dissented. 
50. Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). Justices 
Brennan and Marshall dissented. 
51. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). Justices 
Brennan and Marshall were among the dissenters in both cases. 
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Professor Brest may, I think, be relying somewhat too heavily on 
hindsight in characterizing the Warren Court's task in cases like 
Brown v. Board of Education 52 and Loving v. Virginia (striking down 
a Virginia miscegenation law)53 as "easy." That certainly was not 
the common perception at the time; nor were those broad opinions 
greeted with unanimous approval and good will, even by enor-
mously distinguished commentators. 54 The important point for pres-
ent purposes, however, is that the Warren Court, after much too long 
a delay (another indication, perhaps, that things were not that 
"easy") had, by 1968, finally committed itself to eliminating the ef-
fects of previous de jure school segregation "root and branch."55 It 
also showed a degree of creativity in other areas, such as in reducing 
the negative impact of the state action doctrine on civil rights en-
forcement, 56 and in its "surprising" revitalization of the 1866 Civil 
Rights Act (p. 113).57 
It seems relevant to ask, in assessing whether and to what extent 
things have changed, how the Warren Court would have addressed 
and solved the racial issues of the 1970's had it continued with the 
same membership or same basic attitudes. And, as with gender dis-
crimination, it seems plausible that things would, in that event, have 
been substantially different. Is it clear, for example, that the Warren 
Court would have held (as the Burger Court did)58 that desegrega-
tion orders can almost never cross school district boundaries, thus 
making meaningful integration of public schools practically impossi-
ble in some areas? The decision was, in fact, five to four, all four 
dissents coming from Warren Court holdovers. Would the Warren 
Court, perhaps, also have adopted the constitutional position of Jus-
tices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmon (three of the four be-
ing Warren Court holdovers) in the Bakke case?59 That position was 
much more favorable to effectuation of meaningful affirmative ac-
tion programs than was Justice Powell's prevailing vote - a vote 
based on an analysis that properly strikes Professor Brest as "non-
sense" (p. 127) and that, in all events, leaves "[t]he status of benign 
race-consciousness . . . unclear'' (p. 128). 
Most importantly, would the Warren Court, which based its deci-
52. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
53. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). The Warren Court had appeared to be enormously reluctant to 
decide this issue. See Nairn v. Nairn, 350 U.S. 891 (1955), 350 U.S. 985 (1956). 
54. See, e.g., L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 54-55 (1958); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Prin• 
ciples of Constitutional Low, 13 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1959). 
55. Green v. New Kent County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968). 
56. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961). 
51. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
58. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). Justices Douglas, Brennan, White and Mar-
shall dissented. 
59. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
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sion in Brown v. Board of Education entirely upon the impact of ra-
cial segregation on the educational opportunities of black children 
and which never, not once, alluded in that unanimous opinion ( or in 
any other opinion) to the need to find a discriminatory "purpose" as 
a predicate to judicial intervention, have adopted the rule of Wash-
ington v. .Davis60 that discriminatory racial impacts, even those re-
sulting from "built-in headwinds,"61 have no constitutional 
significance whatever in the absence of a discriminatory governmen-
tal purpose? Numerous lower court decisions that were expressly re-
pudiated in .Davis had given independent significance to pervasively 
discriminatory impacts. Those courts, at least, thought that Warren 
Court decisions pointed in a different direction; thought, that is, that 
they were authorized to deal not only with form and motive, but also 
with the often devastating realities of disadvantage caused to minori-
ties by facially "neutral" governmental actions brigaded with gener-
ations of public and private racism. Finally, would the Warren 
Court conceivably have held, as the Burger Court did in 198062 (over 
the dissents of Warren Court holdovers Brennan, White, and Mar-
shall) that evidence that a southern city's voting procedures "so di-
luted the power of black voters that, though they constituted thirty-
five percent of the population, no black had ever been elected to the 
city commission" nevertheless "did not state a constitutional claim" 
(p. 124)? 
It is impossible to focus on all important topics in a book like 
this. In evaluating the extent of the Burger Court "counter-revolu-. 
tion" one nevertheless would have wished for some separate focused 
consideration in the present volume upon the numerous Burger 
Court decisions that have foreclosed access to federal courts for large 
and important classes of individual rights claimants. Many com-
mentators63 have considered this group of door-closing decisions 
one of the most dramatic of all Burger Court developments - one 
that significantly reduces the practical effectiveness of rights that, in 
the abstract, the Burger Court may have left untouched. Thus, the 
Burger Court has seriously eroded the deterrent and prophylactic ef-
fectiveness of the fourth and fifth amendment exclusionary rules by 
making the fourth amendment rule unavailable in most circum-
60. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
61. The phrase is from Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). The .Davis 
opinion refused to apply Griggs, which had given significance to nonpurposeful impacts in 
Title VII cases, to constitutional claims. 
62. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). 
63. Including the Society of American Law Teachers (the sponsor of this book) itself. See 
STATEMENT OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF SALT, SUPREME COURT DENIAL OF CITIZENS 
ACCESS TO FEDERAL COURTS TO CHALLENGE UNCONSTITUTIONAL OR OTHER UNLAWFUL 
ACTIONS: THE RECORD OF THE BURGER COURT (1976). 
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stances in federal habeas corpus proceedings, 64 and by departing 
from a leading Warren Court decision65 in order to re-establish strict 
principles of "waiver'' of constitutional claims in state criminal tri-
als.66 In Younger v. Harris67 and its expanding progeny68 the Burger 
Court ( once again overruling the essence of a Warren Court doc-
trine )69 has created a new principle of federal court abstention that 
withdraws many attacks on unconstitutional legislation - especially 
in the areas of free expression, assembly and association - from the 
original jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. Doctrines such as 
standing, ripeness and immunity from suit have been used to insu-
late unconstitutional behavior from judicial review.70 At times the 
Burger Court has even seemed, contrary to the landmark Warren 
Court ruling in Monroe v. Pape ,71 to foreclose federal constitutional 
claims because of the possible availability of a state law remedy.72 A 
general rule to that effect, which may well be imminent,73 would 
have enormous consequences to litigants. In a related area, the Bur-
ger Court has seemed distinctly less willing than one supposes the 
Warren Court would have been to recognize constitutionally pro-
tected liberty and property interests in some areas,74 or to permit 
damages for constitutional violations that are recognized. 75 
A chapter on the expanding limitations of the state action doc-
trine would also have been welcome here. It once seemed, at the 
height of the Warren Court, that the realities of government support 
for "private" racial discrimination had caused the line between pri-
vate and governmental action to have almost disappeared.76 In this 
area, perhaps more than in any other, Justice Rehnquist's much 
more formal and narrow approach to the effective scope of constitu-
tional rights has captured the imagination and votes of the Burger 
64. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 
65. Fay v. Noia, 327 U.S. 391 (1963). 
66. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). 
67. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
68. E.g., Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975); Fair Assesment in Real Estate Assn. v. 
McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981). 
69. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). 
70. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 
(1975); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. I (1972); see also Los Angeles v. Lyons, 103 S. Ct. 1660 
(1983); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). 
71. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
72. E.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). 
73. See Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 52 U.S.L.W. 4155 (U.S. Jan. 24, 
1984). 
74. E.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). 
75. E.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978). 
76. E.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964). 
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Court.77 Separate attention might have been given, as well, to the 
fact that the Burger Court has almost completely stripped vitality 
from the "fundamental rights" branch of the equal- protection 
clause.78 That emerging doctrine of the late Warren Court era was, 
perhaps, laying the groundwork for a set of affirmative constitutional 
entitlements for Americans such that, as Professor Shapiro notes, 
"[i]f some members of the Warren faction had had their way, Ameri-
cans today would have a constitutional right to acquire the basic eco-
nomic necessities from government" (p. 220). Finally, given the 
Burger Court's comprehensive relegation of so many constitutional 
issues to initial consideration by state courts, an examination of the 
Burger Court's use of its certiorari discretion in reviewing those 
courts would potentially have been revealing. Except in death pen-
alty cases, it is almost unheard of these days for the Court to grant 
certiorari in a state criminal case at the petition of a defendant; peti-
tions are frequently (it sometimes appears almost automatically) 
granted, on the other hand, when a state court rules against the pros-
ecution on a fourth, fifth, or sixth amendment claim.79 The Warren 
Court's practice was almost precisely the opposite. 
Professor Blasi has written a penultimate chapter on "The Root-
less Activism of the Burger Court." Its main point is that the Burger 
Court, like the Warren Court, "has been very much an activist 
court" (p. 217). One can readily agree, although I confess to being 
somewhat startled by the first reason Blasi offers for this conclusion, 
namely, the Burger Court's "failure to overrule the precedents of the 
Warren era" (p. 199). Insofar as there has been such a failure to date 
( especially on the part of Justices who would not have joined with 
those precedents to begin with) that would seem to me to indicate a 
certain degree of restraint rather than activism. Nonetheless, the 
Burger Court, as Blasi notes, has been willing both to invalidate acts 
of Congress and "to step into the breach of a constitutional crisis."80 
Nor has it been shy about "broadening the impact of judicial re-
view" by deciding a relatively large number of cases dealing with 
issues concerning constitutional separation of powers (p. 201), and 
by being much more active than the Warren Court in playing "the 
role of umpire of the federal system" (p. 202). Nor can anyone, as 
Blasi observes, "accuse the Burger Court of failing to recognize im-
portant new rights" (p. 204); Roe v. Wade,81 the landmark abortion 
77. E.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 
U.S. 345 (1974). 
78. E.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Plyler v. Doe, 
457 U.S. 202 (1982), may justify the "almost" in the text. 
19. E.g., Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983). 
80. P. 201. The Watergate tapes case, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), is Pro-
fessor Blasi's primary evidence of this inclination. 
8 I. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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decision, is the prime example here. Blasi also invokes the gender 
discrimination cases; the extension of .first amendment protection to 
commercial advertisements; the recognition of "a major federal con-
stitutional limitation on the traditional exercise of jurisdiction by 
state courts in cases involving intangible assets" (p. 204); recognition 
of the "right of a newspaper to control its own pages" and "to be free 
from . . . requirements of 'balanced' news coverage" (p. 204); and 
the Burger Court's numerous "activist" decisions in the area of 
"government .financial aid to sectarian schools" (p. 205). 
There has not, then, been any Burger Court "counter-revolution" 
with regard to the willingness to engage in judicial activism. Indeed, 
although Professor Blasi considers the division between activists and 
"restraintists" (his term) one that "has been at the heart of constitu-
tional discourse for at least the last fifty years" (p. 198), and one that 
is likely to remain important, I tend to agree more with Professor 
Shapiro, who suggests that activism versus restraint is, for now at 
least, a dead issue: "In the heyday of the Warren Court, the Court 
was activist and the commentators were not. In the day of the Bur-
ger Court, the Court is activist and so are the commentators" (p. 
236). The important question, given the announced theme of this 
book, involves the direction and objectives of the Burger Court's ac-
tivism. Here, despite his subtitle, Blasi does detect an immensely 
important shift: "[T]he Warren Court was fired by a vision of the 
equal dignity of man[82] - the equal dignity of white student and 
black student, of urban voter and rural voter, of sophisticated, 
wealthy criminal suspect and ignorant, indigent suspect" (p. 212). 
By contrast, the activism of the Burger Court is "rootless"; its doctri-
nal product "has none of the generative quality or moral force of the 
Warren Court's legacy" (p. 216). 
Professor Blasi attributes this difference primarily to what he per-
ceives as the intellectual dominance of the "center," rather than the 
"extremes," of the Burger Court: "[T]he hallmark of the Burger 
Court has been strength in the center and weakness on the wings" (p. 
211 ). In his view, the swing votes on the Burger Court represent its 
strength: "Seldom, if ever, in the Court's history has there been a 
period when the pivotal Justices were as intelligent, open-minded, 
and dedicated as Potter Stewart, Byron White, Harry Blackmun, 
82. I do not wish to carp, and would not comment on the gratuitous use of the male gender 
here, or in Professor Shapiro's unnecessary (and inaccurate) reference to the Warren Court's 
"one man-one vote" "slogan", p. 225 (the governing principle of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 
533, 560-61 (1964) is "one of equal representation for equal numbers of people" (emphasis 
added)), or in Professor Brest's and Professor Shapiro's repeated references to good and bad 
"guys," pp. 113, 218, were it not for the jarring title of Professor Shapiro's final chapter: "Fa-
thers and Sons: The Court, The Commentators, and the Search for Values." I am not entirely 
clear about the identity of Professor Shapiro's "fathers" or "sons,'' but if they are, respectively, 
the Court and the commentators, one of the "fathers" is, after all, now a mother, and at least a 
few of the "sons" are daughters (one of whom has even written a chapter for this book). 
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Lewis Powell, and John Paul Stevens" (p. 210). Where "the Burger 
Court has been weak compared with previous courts," on the other 
hand, "is at the ideological extremes." Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall are "pragmatic men, more clever than profound." They lack 
"elemental force and vision." And "[t]he same holds true on the 
right." Chief Justice Burger "is a man of limited capacity and no 
discernible coherent philosophy." It is too early to tell about Justice 
O'Connor, although she has displayed a "sharp intellect" and "an 
unexpected [why, one wonders, unexpected?] tendency to think in 
ideological terms." Justice Rehnquist, although possessing "energy, 
charm and a very conservative judicial philosophy" is nevertheless 
''more a debater than a thinker, more a lawyer than a statesman" (p. 
211). 
This is not the place to quarrel, as I surely do in part, with this 
remarkable range of individual assessments, except to say that I, for 
one, detect no generally greater intellectual power or coherence in 
the center than at "the wings" of the current Court. If anything, the 
opposite seems true. I would have thought, for example, that the 
opinions of Justices Brennan and Marshall, on the one hand, and 
Rehnquist and O'Connor, on the other, are by and large at least 
equals in "force and vision" of those of more centrist Justices. To 
the extent that there is a "rootlessness" in the Burger Court so far, it 
seems to me that the primary reason is that, with .the Court's shifting 
membership, solid majorities for epic or obvious doctrinal changes 
have been hard to come by, just as they were hard to come by on the 
Warren Court until Justice Goldberg replaced Justice Frankfurter in 
1962. Between that time (especially after Justice Marshall replaced 
Justice Clark in 1967) and 1969, the Warre11 Court enjoyed its "hey-
day." The Burger Court's heyday, given another ideological ap-
pointment or two by the present Administration, may be about to 
commence. And we are not lacking in clues about where that Court, 
if it ever gets up sufficient steam, seems headed. One need only con-
template the opinions of Justices Burger, Rehnquist, Powell (some-
times), and O'Connor regarding fundamental issues such as states 
rights versus individual rights, property rights versus personal rights, 
middle-class rights versus the rights of the disadvantaged, the rights 
of "criminals" versus the rights of the "peace forces," the lack of 
need for access to federal courts or for prophylactic rules and doc-
trines, the deference due official and legislative judgments, the death 
penalty, and so on. It appears that the 1984 presidential election will 
be an enormously important one in the history of the Supreme 
Court. It would be a shame if the subtitle of this book gave anyone a 
different impression. 
As the present Burger Court volume is published, another, of 
similar format and on the same general subject, is in preparation 
under the sponsorship of the American Civil Liberties Union. The 
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descriptive contents of that volume, I suspect, will be similar in 
many respects to what we find here. (The books share Professor 
Emerson as a contributor; Professor Dorsen, a co-contributor here, is 
the editor there.) The ACLU book is entitled "Our Endangered 
Rights."83 That appellation, I regret to say, seems to capture the 
spirit of the current Supreme Court with substantially more accuracy 
than "The Counter-Revolution That Wasn't." 
83. To be published by Pantheon Press in 1984. In the interests of full disclosure, I must 
reveal that I have also contributed a chapter (on rights of privacy) to the ACLU book. 
